TOWARDS TRUE PARTNERSHIP: EU-AFRICA SUMMIT
A CIDSE Position Paper
Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution/Prevention
The second half of the 20th Century will be remembered as an extremely violent period in modern African history. During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s many African countries fought bitter wars to gain independence from their colonial rulers. Such struggles were particularly violent in countries such as Kenya, Algeria, Zimbabwe, the Congo and Angola. Following independence, many political tensions, which had been subdued by colonialism, manifested themselves in civil conflict. Bitter civil wars raged all over the continent. Countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Sudan were torn apart by conflict. Following independence the hope of Africa becoming a continent of peaceful democratic states quickly evaporated. In post independence Africa more than 70 military coups have been registered. Much of this conflict in Africa was fuelled by "Superpower" rivalries. The U.S.A. and the former USSR overtly took sides with opposing factions in individual countries and showed their support by providing military hardware and training. While Europe had engaged in Africa as a colonial power and as a defender of colonialism during the struggle for independence, during this turbulent period of African history, it stood aside as US and USSR interests dominated the continent.
While "Superpower" interests led to a certain balance of power or terror in Africa, the post cold war period led to increased violence and chaos in many African countries. This period saw the emergence of what are now termed as "complex emergencies" where the civilian population became embroiled in conflict through injury or death or as a result of displacement and hunger. The last decade of the 20th Century witnessed some of the most horrific conflict situations in Africa with hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties. Most notable among these were Rwanda, Somalia, Angola, Sudan, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
With the disengagement of the US and former USSR from Africa in the late 1980s, the European Union began to try to devise a strategy for conflict prevention in Africa. Alarmed by the devastating impact of complex emergencies the EU looked at the possible role it could play in preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Consensus among the Member States about agreed definitions and about implementation strategies was not easy to reach. Some Member States felt that the EU’s role should be limited to providing support and co-ordination structures for the national activities of individual Member States and that the main focus should be on support for African initiatives. This essentially meant that the EU and its Member States should concentrate on traditional political, diplomatic and military instruments in the field of peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy.
Others promoted a more proactive approach whereby the EU would engage in joint activities in an effort to prevent and manage conflict in Africa. Such a strategy might lead to the establishment of a rapid response force, more development assistance for conflict resolution programmes and particular emphasis being placed on the prevention of violent conflicts at an earlier stage. Despite the divergence of views among the Member States, the Spanish presidency of the second half of 1995 saw the adoption of the Council Conclusions on "Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa". This was followed in 1996 by the Communication of the European Commission on "The European Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa; peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond".
This document set out to define many of the terms used in the debate on conflict. During the Dutch Presidency of the EU in the first half of 1997, the Netherlands Government pledged that it would give considerable attention to the issues of conflict prevention and coherence within the European Union. With the Commission’s Communication of 1996 no doubt influencing the debate, 1997 saw three major documents that today form much of the basis of the EU’s policy on conflict in Africa. These were: The Common Position on "Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa" (June 1997), The Council Conclusions on "Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa" (June 1997), and the section dealing with ‘Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution’ in the Council Resolution on Coherence (June 1997). While these three documents reflected a broad consensus among Member States concerning the issue of violent conflicts in Africa (and in the developing world in general), operationalisation of the principles enshrined therein became the major challenge. One of the guiding principles of all EU policy on this issue continues to be "African Ownership" of conflict prevention, management and resolution. Therefore, it remains a priority for the EU to enhance Africa’s capacity in this regard at the level of government institutions and of civil society. Accordingly, the EU has placed particular emphasis on enhancing the capacity of African regional organisations. This has led to EU-OAU dialogue at ministerial and at expert level where conflict prevention and EU support for OAU conflict management remains the most important topic for discussion. It has also led to EU financial support for OAU conflict resolution programmes. The Union has also developed relationships with sub-regional organisations such as Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in East Africa. Support for such organisations has had varying degrees of success.
In May 1999 a Commission Communication was published entitled "Co-operation with ACP Countries involved in Armed Conflicts". This document was a review of development co-operation practice with countries at war and a reaffirmation of the importance of ‘conflict prevention’ as outlined in the recommendations of the 1996 Communication. This was prompted to a great extent by the escalation of the Congo conflict into a regional war. The continuing lack of government and ensuing lawlessness in Somalia was also a contributing factor in its publication.
Despite the various efforts made by the European Union to develop a coherent policy on conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, it is clear that this initiative is still in its early stages and a great deal of work needs to be done to look at how the principles enshrined in EU documents can be properly operationalised. As long as member states have different geo-political interests, the European Union will have little joint influence for example in the current conflict involving many African countries in the Democratic Republic of Congo despite the Commission Communication of May 1999. As a major international player, with strong historic partnership links to Africa, the EU could assert greater influence on military spending in Africa and encourage African regimes them to start serious peace negotiations with all parties involved. The issue of international co-ordination also needs to be carefully looked at; especially the EU’s relationship with the United Nations and issues of policy coherence needs to be treated with greater seriousness by the EU. The latter includes areas such as the arms trade. For instance the debate on governance as part of the New Partnership Agreement did not cover situations of countries in conflict, issues of conflict prevention and conflict resolution or of Europe's role in fuelling conflict situations. Major concerns for Africa countries in conflict and their citizens such as the arms trade and the EU member states' role in this did not merit a mention. Yet the EU has agreed a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and has legislation in force on the EU contributing to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons. These initiatives are welcome but will remain ineffective in many respects if they are not rigorously monitored, assiduously pursued and appropriate sanctions applied to those in breach of these agreements. An arms embargo to conflict areas is now the best policy option.
And the arms industry is not the only aspect of trade which helps to fuel conflict - the circumventing of sanctions and trade embargoes over the years has been well documented. A particularly current example relates to the diamond industry and how the (legal and illicit) sale of diamonds has helped to maintain conflict in countries such as Sierra Leone and Angola. In early March 2000, the Belgian government committed itself to adopting stringent measures to screen out those diamonds from Angola that are traded in contravention of the UN embargo. Implementing this is now the main challenge. While the Belgian decision is a welcome step what is clearly also needed is for the UK and other EU governments to follow suit. The role of oil and other companies from European countries in fuelling conflict in Africa needs to be investigated and made subject to extra-territorial EU legislation. The example of sex offences with children committed by European nationals in developing countries, prosecuting the offenders at home under European law, should be followed here.
The need for policy coherence in relation to conflict in Africa goes far beyond trade issues into areas such as the role of development assistance in conflict prevention, management and resolution either through direct programmes or indirectly through poverty eradication programmes.
Finally, the development of independent media in Africa is crucial to informing the African public about situations of conflict in the region, the role of the (African and non-African) parties in these conflicts and options to peacefully resolve conflict. The EU should make more resources available for this purpose.